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This article defends state sovereignty as necessary for a form of popular sovereignty 
capable of realising the republican value of non-domination, and argues it remains 
empirically achievable and normatively warranted in an inter-connected world. Many 
scholars, including certain republicans, contend that the external sovereignty of 
states can no longer be maintained or justified in such circumstances. Consequently, 
we must abandon the sovereignty of states and reconceive popular sovereignty on a 
different basis. Some argue sovereignty must be displaced upwards to a more global 
state, while others advocate it be vertically and horizontally dispersed to units below, 
across and above the state. Each group offers a related vision of the European Union 
(EU) to illustrate their proposals. Both these arguments are criticised as more likely 
to produce than reduce domination because neither can sustain a form of popular 
sovereignty capable of instantiating relations of non-domination. This article 
proposes the alternative of a republican association of sovereign states that allows 
sovereign states and their peoples to mutually regulate their external sovereignty in 
non-dominating ways. It offers a more plausible and defensible means for sustaining 
the requisite kind of popular sovereignty in contemporary conditions, and a more 
appropriate vision of the EU. 
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The issue of state sovereignty lies at the heart of many debates about the democratic 
legitimacy of European integration. On the one hand, critics of the EU frequently 
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complain it erodes state sovereignty and thereby weakens the capacity of domestic 
electorates to control and influence how they are governed (Malcolm 1991). On the 
other hand, defenders of the EU often argue either that shifting at least some 
sovereignty to the EU provides a means for increasing such control and influence 
given the global nature of many issues (Held 1995: 111-13; Morgan 2005: 142-54; 
Habermas 2012: 37-53); or that the weakening of state sovereignty helps promote a 
cosmopolitan respect for individual rights and justice (Pogge 1992: 58; MacCormick 
1999: 128-9). If the first group defends the sovereignty of the member states, the 
second group seeks a transfer of sovereignty to the EU level, while the third group 
aims to go beyond any form of state sovereignty. What follows defends an alternative 
view of the EU as an association of sovereign states. Grounded in a republican theory 
of non-domination (Pettit 2010: 70-75), it lies in key respects midway between the 
three more familiar positions.  
 Sovereignty can be assessed in relation to many other values besides non-
domination (Caney 2005: ch 5). However, non-domination captures a central concern 
of the sovereignty debate relating to the capacity for citizens to be free from alien 
control and influence (Laborde and Ronzoni 2015). Like sovereignty, non-domination 
is a quality realised through a certain configuration of political institutions (Pettit 
2012: 22). Indeed, a central tradition of republican thought, to which this piece aligns 
itself, has associated the achievement of non-domination with sovereignty (Rousseau 
1762; Kant 1797). Yet, republicans also have been wary of the potential for 
domination offered by certain conceptions of sovereignty (Pettit 2012: 14-15), with a 
number of contemporary republicans rejecting the notion entirely, often on grounds 
analogous to those of liberal cosmopolitans (e.g. Bohman 2004a). In fact, all three of 
the familiar positions outlined above have been justified by various theorists on 
republican grounds and offered as models of the EU (e.g. respectively Miller 2008; 
Marti 2010 and Habermas 1998: 106, 116-7, 150; and MacCormick 1999: ch 9, 
Bohman 2004b, Besson 2006 and Ladvas and Chrissochoou 2011). Exploring which 
configuration of sovereignty might best realise non-domination within the EU seems 
pertinent, therefore. 
The account proposed here conceives the EU as a republican association of 
sovereign states that is designed to overcome the possibility for their mutual 
domination while providing a mechanism for their securing certain global goods and 
avoiding various global bads, not least through their reciprocal recognition of rights to 
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citizenship (Bellamy 2013). It seeks to combine the respective advantages of the other 
three positions while escaping their disadvantages. Like the state sovereigntists, I 
shall argue that popular sovereignty presupposes state sovereignty of a kind that has 
been already constituted within the member states. However, state sovereigntists risk 
ignoring the degree to which global interconnectedness can inhibit the capacity of 
states for self-government and creates or reinforces moral obligations of a 
cosmopolitan kind to uphold the right to citizenship of all individuals regardless of 
state borders. Like advocates of shifting sovereignty to regional or even global bodies, 
therefore, I shall contend that popular sovereignty can be enhanced rather than 
diminished through states cooperating within a regional organisation such as the EU. 
Yet, supra-state sovereigntists underestimate the normative loss incurred in 
dismantling already existing legal and political orders and reconstituting them to 
encompass a far larger and more diverse population. Even more than state 
sovereigntists, they also pay insufficient attention to the dominating potential of 
sovereignty within states and how these might be exacerbated in a larger unit. As the 
post-sovereigntists suggest, I shall maintain such a regional arrangement need not  - 
and should not – be conceived as involving any transfer of state sovereignty to the 
EU. But it need and should not lead to a weakening or dispersal of state sovereignty 
either. Cosmopolitan supporters of dispersing sovereignty among a range of 
functional, local and transnational bodies above and below the state overlook how 
effective and equitable control and influence depends on individuals forming part of a 
people, capable of exercising collective oversight on the basis of commonly avowable 
reasons over the whole range of policies and forces effecting their shared interests. 
Moreover, outside such arrangements it may prove hard to obtain agreement on which 
rights to enforce, when and how, or to mobilise support for doing so (Bellamy 2012). 
Consequently, those agents and agencies seeking to uphold cosmopolitan norms risk 
being illegitimate and ineffective. By contrast, I shall show how a republican 
association of sovereign states allows citizens to regulate their external sovereignty in 
non-dominating ways consistent with cosmopolitan norms by creating supra-national 
institutions under their mutual control that uphold the rights of their respective 
citizens to self-government.  
The argument develops in two stages. The first stage defines state sovereignty 
and defends it on republican grounds as necessary to establish a form of politics 
capable of instituting relations of non-domination among citizens. Section 1 defines 
   4 
sovereignty as a political authority that possesses finality through being supreme and 
comprehensive. These qualities are then said to presuppose a territorially demarcated 
polity and a corresponding regime, both of which develop coevally with the 
constitution of a related people and an agent or agency enjoying the right to rule.  
Section 2 argues that sovereignty so conceived provides the context for 
institutionalising a form of popular sovereignty in which citizens can fairly and freely 
agree on public rules of justice in a non-dominating manner. The second stage, 
examines the possibility and justifiability of sovereignty so defined and defended 
once states and their peoples interact and become interconnected. In these 
circumstances, the external sovereignty of states has been regarded as not only 
promoting injustice (Caney 2005: 182; Pogge 1992: 58) but also impossible (Sassan 
1996: 29, Slaughter 2005: 12), thereby undercutting internal sovereignty. Taking the 
EU as a response to this situation, these sections explore respectively whether 
sovereignty within the EU ought to be displaced upwards to the EU level, as supra-
state federalist sovereigntists argue (Section 3); dispersed and divided, as post-
sovereignty theorists propose (Section 4); or is best conceived as an international 
association of sovereign states and their peoples, whereby they accord each other 
equal concern and respect by delegating certain competences to supranational 
institutions that regulate their interactions while remaining under their mutual control 
(Section 5). 
 
1. Defining Sovereignty 
The defining features of sovereign rule are standardly given as finality, supremacy 
and comprehensiveness, in which the first depends on the second and third (Hinsley 
1986: 1, 26). To possess sovereign authority is to be able to decide an issue. Hence 
the sovereign must have the final word. As such, a sovereign must be supreme vis-à-
vis alternative sources of authority and have a comprehensive jurisdiction over the 
activities of those under its sway. Without the separation and supremacy of political 
over religious, legal, economic and other forms of authority and power, political 
decisions will be open to challenge by rival authorities and so cannot be final. 
Likewise, if sovereign authority does not encompass all social interactions it will be 
impossible to take into account the knock on effects of a decision in one area for those 
in other areas, thereby also making the finality of any decision open to question.  
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 Sovereignty so defined has typically been associated with a sovereign state 
possessing the following four features: it forms a territorially defined polity, with its 
own system of governance or regime, its own ruler comprising the agent(s) or 
agency(ies) forming the highest and decisive organ within the regime, and its own 
people (the demos) (Troper 2010: 137-39). These four features interact in a variety of 
ways, with sovereignty being the product of that interaction. For a ruler and a regime 
to be sovereign, they must be supreme with regard to the social activities of the 
individual members of the people residing within a sovereign polity. Sovereignty so 
conceived has both an internal and an external dimension. Sovereignty implies being 
subject to no other authority at home and the equal of other sovereigns abroad. It also 
involves both a de facto and a de jure condition – it designates, respectively, the 
capacity to rule and the right to rule over those subject to the sovereign’s authority. In 
addition, sovereignty may be understood both negatively, as freedom from other 
sources of power and authority, and positively, as freedom to act in self-chosen ways. 
Finally, sovereignty is an attribute not only of the agent(s) or agency(ies) that rule but 
also of the regime, the domain and the people through and over which and whom they 
rule: it refers not only to the sovereignty of the rulers but also of the regime whereby 
their rule is implemented and legitimated and the polity and the people to which and 
over whom it applies (Caney 2005: 149-50).  
 An externally and negatively sovereign realm or polity offers the context 
within which the internal and positive sovereignty of a regime and a ruler can be 
exercised, with the de jure right to govern of a given regime and ruler resting on their 
de facto capacity to preserve the sovereignty of the polity. Indeed, within the 
developing language of sovereignty claims, the sovereignty of the polity and its 
members and the sovereignty of rulers – be they princes or the populace – and a given 
regime became inextricably connected and coeval (Sheehan 2006; Skinner 2010). The 
status of sovereign rulers depended on their ability ‘to maintain’ the sovereignty of 
their state, as the polity came to be termed, with such maintenance involving not only 
the securing of the negative, external sovereignty of the polity but also the internal 
exercise of positive sovereignty to promote its well-being and prosperity. In other 
words, the sovereign right to rule involved an obligation to preserve and foster the 
sovereignty of the polity, and hence of its members, externally and internally, 
negatively and positively.  
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 These four elements of sovereignty form a mutually supporting package, 
therefore. As I shall argue in section 2, they prove necessary for a government to be 
duly authorised to represent a people and their polity and be accountable to them. By 
supporting popular sovereignty they help secure the value of non-domination among 
individuals who acknowledge the importance of showing each other equal concern 
and respect. Yet, an appropriate configuration of internal sovereignty will not be 
sufficient to secure non-domination if the polity and regime do not possess external 
sovereignty and so can be dominated from outside. Hence the need to address the 
plausibility and desirability of sovereignty claims in an interconnected world, and to 
investigate how the dimensions of polity, regime, ruler and people might be 
reconfigured to achieve non-domination in such circumstances - the topic of sections 
3-5.  
 
2. Defending Sovereignty 
The definition given above is essentially Hobbesian (Hobbes 1651; Skinner 2010: 34-
37). Developing its reworking by Rousseau (1762) and Kant (1797), as analysed and 
advocated in a number of recent studies (Stilz 2009; Ripstein 2009; Flikschuk 2010), 
this section defends sovereignty so defined on republican grounds as necessary to 
secure non-domination. 
 
State sovereignty and free persons 
At the heart of the republican concern with domination lies a view of human beings as 
moral equals, each entitled to act on their own autonomous choices on the same basis 
to everyone else. Following Philip Pettit (2010: 73-5; 2012: ch. 1), non-domination 
can be defined as the absence of alien, non-deliberative control. Deliberative control, 
whereby others seek to persuade you via reasons you can accept or not, respects one’s 
equal status as an independent reasoner and so involves no domination. By contrast, 
an agent or agency exercises non-deliberative control over your choices when they 
influence them either directly, be it through coercive interference or, more subtly, by 
manipulation or deception, or indirectly, without actual interference, through your 
simply fearing or anticipating their capacity to interfere and inhibiting your actions as 
a result of invigilation or monitoring, in ways that may lead to self-censorship or self-
ingratiation. On the republican account, domination of both the interfering and the 
inhibiting kind results from a relationship of actual or potential mastery of one agent 
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or agency by another. It derives from a situation in which one is no longer an equal 
and independent chooser. Herein lies the link that a number of republicans sought to 
establish between non-domination and sovereignty. If domination arises from being 
subject to a master, then individuals will only be non-dominated to the extent they are 
free from mastery as a result of possessing sovereignty, which we saw by definition 
entails having no superior (Rousseau 1762: I.6, 7: 49-53; Kant 1797: 138-9). 
 Establishing a situation in which each individual possesses sovereignty poses 
a dilemma, as both Rousseau and Kant fully appreciated. If individuals could live 
entirely independently of one another, as self-sufficient units, without any interaction, 
then each could be sovereign over his or her choices and domain. Likewise, if all 
acknowledged the sovereignty of justice, then cooperation between individuals could 
be based on voluntary agreements that acknowledged their respective rights. 
However, given that social interaction proves both necessary and unavoidable, while 
the partiality of all individuals to their own interests and perspectives makes 
disagreements about justice inevitable, then  - following Hobbes (1651: ch 13) – these 
authors argued that the need arose for a sovereign political authority capable of 
determining and enforcing collectively binding rules of social conduct. Without such 
an authority, then – again drawing on Hobbes ((1651: ch 17) – they contended each 
individual ran the risk of being dominated by, or themselves dominating, every other 
individual they came into contact with. In a situation where individuals unilaterally 
decide whether others have infringed their rights or they have infringed the rights of 
others, then – unless they all happen to agree on what is right – none has a duty to 
respect the view of rights held by others. They also cannot rightfully impose their 
view of justice on anyone else without similarly denying their moral equality as an 
equally authoritative judge of what justice demands. Therefore, sovereign authority 
becomes a precondition of justice because only such an authority can deliver a 
decisive and common process of adjudication capable of reliably and stably 
establishing objective duties on all. It provides this possibility precisely through being 
supreme and comprehensive, and thereby offering the prospect of replacing the 
unilateral will and subjective judgement of particular individuals with an omnilateral 
will in which each decides the same thing for all (Rousseau 1762: II.6: 66-8; Kant 
1797: 137-8; Stilz 2009: 38-56). 
 The danger with this proposal lies in such a sovereign power also offering an 
unrivalled prospect for domination through becoming itself the instrument of a 
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particular will, a worry raised once more by Hobbes and his account of sovereign 
power, with its apparent rejection of republican fears regarding domination (Hobbes 
1651: ch. 21). From a republican perspective, the fundamental challenge posed by the 
creation of such a sovereign authority was whether it was possible, in Rousseau’s 
words (1762: I.6: 49-50), ‘to find a form of association which will defend and protect 
with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which 
each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free 
as before.’ As is well known, Rousseau’s response was that the only way to meet this 
challenge was by locating sovereignty in the people’s democratically constructed 
general will (Stilz 2009: ch 3). What follows extrapolates from that argument to offer 
a rationale for why a non-dominating form of democracy assumes the four 
dimensions of a sovereign polity, regime, rule and people outlined above.  
 
Popular Sovereignty and non-domination 
The attraction of a sovereign political authority rests on its providing a solution to the 
problem of individuals being dominated by the partial judgments and particular wills 
of others. Any single individual  - however well intentioned and selfless – will have a 
partial perspective, in the sense of being inevitably limited in their ability to 
comprehend or even be aware of all other peoples’ situations, interests and views, and 
likely – even unwittingly - to favour their own interests and point of view. Yet that 
means overcoming partiality cannot be achieved by deferring to arbitration by some 
self-styled impartial third party or parties. So conceived, a sovereign authority would 
be part of the problem rather than its solution, for it could not avoid acting arbitrarily 
towards those subject to it. Democracy proposes a solution to this difficulty by 
placing sovereign authority in an impartial mechanism that offers a public means for 
showing equal concern and respect to the views and interests of all citizens in 
determining collective policies. Such a mechanism aims to allow citizens to agree 
despite their disagreements by providing a way of making decisions all can accept as 
legitimate even when they dissent from a given decision (Christiano 2008: ch 6).  
A democratic procedure consisting of majority rule based on one person one 
vote formally meets this requirement in being anonymous, neutral and positively 
responsive (May 1952).  However, such a formal mechanism offers at best a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition to avoid domination. If a majority vote 
reflects the ‘will of all’ rather than a ‘general will’, then, as Rousseau (1762: I.3: 60) 
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noted, the possibility arises of certain groups dominating others because each will 
have voted with the sole objective of furthering their partial interests and perspective. 
For example, a consistent minority could be subject to the arbitrary will of a majority 
if the majority’s partial interests can be furthered through the exploitation of the 
minority and the suppression of their views. Such worries lay behind the republican 
hostility to factions. To avoid this possibility, a democratic process must also 
incentivise citizens to justify their collective decisions to each other on the basis of 
commonly avowable reasons that acknowledge the entitlement of all citizens to be 
treated with equal concern and respect. Though many policies will benefit particular 
groups, they must do so for general reasons that are acknowledged as applying 
equally to all and that promote a shareable public interest. Therefore, democratic 
legitimacy will depend to some degree on whether those making the collective 
decisions for themselves relate to each other in ways that render such an equal and 
public process possible and appropriate (Rawls 1999, 23-4).  
Two types of relations prove especially important in defining a demos among 
whom a democratic process for collective decision-making will be legitimate. As we 
shall see, the four dimensions of sovereignty provide the context for the emergence of 
both. First, there needs to be a high degree of interdependence between the members 
of a community and their most important interests must be more or less equally tied 
up in it, and be so over a long period of time – sufficient to care about the impact of 
current decisions for future generations (Christiano 2010: 130-32). Interdependence 
stimulates crosscutting cleavages that make interest groups less factionalised, ease 
trade-offs and diminish the possibility of consistent winners and losers. A rough 
equality of stake in the overall package of collective decisions gives citizens an equal 
interest in ensuring the basic structures of social cooperation are fair and equitable. It 
frames a commitment to promoting and sustaining investment in certain public goods 
that are conducive to their different projects, including collective schemes of social 
insurance and the maintenance of fair democratic procedures for deliberating on the 
public good. If some have less of a stake in these collective decisions than others, then 
it would not be legitimate for them to have an equal say because their interest in them 
will be partial by definition. They will be more inclined to underfund policies 
supporting a common good in which they do not share and to promote policies that 
support their sectional interests. 
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Second, and relatedly, citizens need to conceive themselves as a public and be 
able to act as such (Miller 2009: 212). Such a self-conception gains support from a 
shared public culture and sphere, themselves the product of a shared history, language 
and customs that create a feeling of like-mindedness and the sense of participating in 
a collective project.   A shared public culture provide a source of agreement on the 
kind of issues that can be raised and the values that can be appealed to, making it less 
likely interlocutors will view each other’s points as mere personal opinions and 
interests that do not need to be addressed and responded to, thereby aiding 
compromise through focussing on common principles and priorities. A shared public 
sphere involving common media, discourse and language or languages allow citizens 
to address each other as a public and encourage politicians to do so by offering 
common forums through which to communicate with each other. Otherwise the 
danger is that politicians could simply play different groups off each other, saying 
different and even contradictory things to each. Citizens too will not be forced to hear 
the other side. There will be no incentive to develop only commonly avowable 
policies and principles that address shareable values and interests or mutually 
acceptable compromises. Such incentives oblige those seeking special privileges, such 
as a religious group seeking an exemption from certain common policies or a business 
asking for a tax break, to frame their demand in terms of a general principle or benefit 
applicable to the whole community and not just them. Again, the risk is that otherwise 
society will become divided into discrete and insular publics, with distinct views and 
interests on key issues. As a result, the possibility of partial decision-making 
favouring only given sectorial groups increases, as does the potential for persistent 
minorities. 
A democratic process that operates subject to these conditions proves non-
dominating. Mastery of a kind that leads to domination arises from an imbalance of 
power, dependency and arbitrariness (Lovett 2010: 119-20). If A has more power than 
B, then A can reliably alter B’s choices but not vice versa. In this scheme, all have an 
equal power in making collective decisions and none can reliably control another. If B 
is dependent on A, then the cost to B of defying A may be prohibitively high. 
However, under this arrangement all are equally subject to and have an equal stake in 
collective rules and goods that are under their free and equal control. As Rousseau 
observed, ‘each, by giving himself to all, gives himself to no one’ (Rousseau, 1762: 
I.6: 50). There is mutual but not personal dependence. Finally, arbitrariness exists if A 
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can will what B chooses according to A’s partial judgment and interests, without 
consulting those of B. Here, though, collective rules must consult the commonly 
avowable judgements and interests of those subject to them. 
 Clearly, actually existing democratic systems operate with varying degrees of 
success in meeting these conditions and at best are ‘nearly democratic’ in the 
specified senses. To some degree, this variation depends on specific details of their 
political and social arrangements, such as the electoral system, which cannot be 
explored here. However, they will also be affected by the way sovereignty is 
arranged. Historically, state sovereignty has provided the context within which 
democratic mechanisms have been able to emerge within all the member states 
(Skinner 2010). How has state sovereignty helped give democratic decision-making 
these qualities?  
First, as we saw supremacy and comprehensiveness supply a precondition for 
all policies being made by and applying equally to all. Unless a single authority has 
ultimate responsibility for the totality of social relations and is under the control of all 
subject to them, then collective decisions will not be those of and for the collectivity. 
They will reflect partial interests and perspectives.  Second, these attributes of 
sovereignty arise from a sovereign ruling agent or agency being located within a 
polity with its own regime and people. State building typically created all four aspects 
simultaneously, and in the process formed a national economic system and political 
culture (Rokkan 1974). These developments typically came about coercively, 
invariably through armed force, and were further solidified by war. Yet, as a result 
citizens became part of a polity-wide scheme of social cooperation and could share a 
public sphere. However unjust their origins, they provide an environment within 
which citizens can establish justice by engaging in the collective practice of defining 
and upholding a fair scheme of rights.  
 
Internal Sovereignty and the ‘Mixed Constitution’ 
On this account, the self-determination of a sovereign people provides the ‘right to 
have rights’ (Arendt 1958: 296). Nevertheless, some contemporary republicans fear 
that having a single sovereign authority reduces the possibility for minority groups to 
contest majority decisions. They regard dividing sovereignty via a mixed constitution 
as favouring such contestation (Pettit 2012: 12-13, 220-25). As we shall see, similar 
considerations motivate advocates of a dispersal of sovereignty. However, such 
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mechanisms risk allowing groups to avoid offering a public, commonly avowable, 
justification for their partial interests, for example by vetoing decisions they claim 
infringe their rights. Yet, to be legitimate, rights claims need to be made in a way that 
shows equal concern and respect towards those being asked to uphold them. 
Otherwise they will be based on private judgements, and not morally obligatory for 
other citizens. As Rousseau (1762: I.7) remarked, that would involve individuals 
seeking ‘to enjoy the rights of a citizen without being willing to fulfil the duties of a 
subject’. At some point, such claims need to be made in a way that involves an 
impartial weighing of the rights of the community as a whole. That does not 
invalidate having ways to ensure minorities are not unduly overlooked and their 
voices get an equal hearing, merely that fairness requires that ultimately they must be 
considered as part of a collective scheme that treats all as free and equal, 
Hobbes’ (1651: ch. 29: 228) objections to ‘mixt government’ notwithstanding, 
a sovereign agency of rule need not be indivisible nor a sovereign regime unitary. 
Sovereign rule can be shared between different bodies with distinct roles or that must 
act concurrently, such as an upper and a lower house. Such divisions may help 
promote a balance of power between citizens. Yet, sovereign power could still lie in a 
single joint agency, as in the British formulation endowing sovereignty in the Queen 
in Parliament, signifying a concurrence of executive and the upper and lower houses. 
Likewise, a sovereign polity can have a federal regime in which certain powers are 
devolved to sub territorial units as a matter of administrative convenience on the basis 
of rules and criteria decided at the federal level. Power sharing and devolution allow a 
regime to adapt to the diversity of a polity, such as the presence of socio-economic 
and cultural differences, while still remaining sovereign. There simply needs to be 
procedures or mechanisms capable of resolving conflicts between different bodies 
that constitute a single sovereign authority. Nevertheless, the more segmental the 
divisions within the polity become, the more the devolution of power to sub-territorial 
units is likely to give rise to separate peoples within a polity. To the extent that is the 
case, citizens of these different units will gradually cease to regard themselves as 
engaged as a public in making common policies. Rather, they will increasingly wish 
their political representatives to share power at the federal level and represent their 
right as different peoples to collective self-government. Their aim will be to secure 
fair terms to do so alongside other peoples within the polity and even negotiate 
secession (Dahl 1989, 258-59). In so doing, they will move towards a republican 
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association of sovereign states of the kind described in section 5 – one reason why the 
EU can facilitate the political empowerment of minority nations. 
 
External Sovereignty and Free States 
The argument given above contends that a sovereign democratic authority provides 
the basis for non-domination among citizens, not how many such authorities there 
should be or where they ought to be located. Yet for a sovereign state to secure the 
context for free persons through a non-dominating form of popular sovereignty it 
must be a free state, not dominated by other states, agents or agencies (Laborde and 
Ronzoni 2015). Many scholars believe such conditions no longer hold because global 
interdependence has challenged the external sovereignty of states and with it their 
internal sovereignty. New technologies have brought polities and their peoples closer 
together and rendered them more interconnected than ever before. Borders are not just 
more open to conventional and unconventional forms of armed aggression, with 
terrorist attacks penetrating the defences of even the most militarily mighty states, but 
also have been made progressively permeable by the globalisation of production, 
property ownership and finance as well as trade, and are increasingly tested by the 
migration of people. These global processes diminish the capacity of a sovereign 
polity and its regime to act as a supreme authority capable of securing the physical 
and economic well being of a people. A sovereign people risk being dominated and 
interfered with by the decisions and actions of different kinds of externally situated 
agents and agencies – be they other polities, wealthy financiers, multinational 
corporations, armed groups, or poor migrants (Pettit 2010: 77-9). Likewise, it has 
become ever harder for polities to reap the benefits of any positive externalities 
resulting from their activities or to protect themselves from the negative externalities 
of the activities of other polities. For example, their clean environmental policies may 
benefit neighbouring states but be unable to counteract the pollution stemming from 
poor environmental controls of these same neighbours. At the same time, many argue 
that the continuing exclusions created by sovereign institutions involve unjustly 
dominating individuals who happen to have been born into poor or failing states and 
find themselves unable to leave or forced to take huge risks to do so only to end up in 
migrant camps. 
Polities cannot tackle these problems effectively on their own. A system of 
autarchic states is not an option. In greater or lesser ways, they need to cooperate to 
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regulate their interactions and secure certain global public goods in ways that are 
equal and fair. The EU has been seen as a test ground of possible responses in this 
regard. As we saw, some republicans argue that it enables a shift towards a regional 
federal union that could resolve the problems associated with the erosion of external 
sovereignty, on the one hand, and unjust exclusions, on the other, by including all 
within a larger sovereign polity (Marti 2010). Others suggest that it allows for the 
dispersal of sovereignty and the move towards a post-sovereign political system that 
avoids the risks associated with concentrating power in any single agency (Bohman 
2004b). In examining both proposals below, I shall argue that neither can sustain a 
form of politics capable of avoiding domination of the kind described above. As an 
alternative, I shall propose a republican association of sovereign states 
 
3. A Sovereign EU?: Sovereignty Displaced and Diluted 
The ideal of a sovereign federal Europe predates the EU and animated some of its 
earliest proponents, while still remaining a goal for many (Burgess 2000). As we saw, 
dividing and devolving sovereignty do not in themselves undermine the possibility of 
a sovereign authority. Consequently, the governance structures of a federal European 
polity could be complex, requiring agreement between bodies representing both EU 
citizens and various sub-federal units, such as member states and regions, and involve 
a considerable degree of subsidiarity to these lower units, yet still possess 
sovereignty. However, unlike current arrangements, within such a federal EU the 
division of competences between the levels would be decided at the EU level rather 
than via agreement between the member states, and the legitimacy for doing so would 
come from citizens directly debating and endorsing European level policy making, 
even if those policies were mediated by agencies operating at various lower levels, 
with these also retaining competences in many areas.  
A federal EU would potentially provide the polity sovereignty necessary to 
construct a basic political structure at the EU level. However, to be non-dominating, 
even a highly differentiated federal EU would also need, at least for certain purposes, 
to possess a European people willing and able to identify and act as a popular 
sovereign capable of ensuring the sovereign EU regime and its rulers operate under 
their equal influence and control to advance their commonly avowable interests. 
Section 2 defined a people in the political sense as possessing the capacity to 
deliberate in a public way about the public interest. As we saw, this capacity is 
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facilitated by citizens possessing interconnected interests and a roughly equal stake in 
collective decisions, and sharing a public culture and sphere. Proponents of the ‘no-
demos’ thesis contend these social and cultural conditions have so far failed to 
develop at the EU level (Weiler 1998: 246, Scharpf 1999: 8- 9). Social and economic 
divergence, on the one side, and cultural and linguistic diversity, on the other, remain 
robust. Even if the ideological and policy preferences of citizens are no more diverse 
across the EU as a whole than they are within most member states and similarly cross-
cutting (Hale and Koenig-Archibugi 2016), there can still be segmental divisions 
between both regions with highly divergent levels of socio-economic development 
and different national groups who conceive themselves as distinct peoples. Such 
divisions already exist within many of the member states and drive calls for 
devolution in Scotland and Catalonia, for example. Across the EU they would be even 
stronger. Only 2% of EU citizens view themselves as ‘Europeans’ pure and simple, 
with a mere 6% regarding a European identity as more important than their national 
one (EB 83 Spring 2015).  
In such conditions, a high risk exists of dominating decisions deriving from 
unequal stakes, a lack of incentives to address issues of common concern in a public 
manner, and the likelihood of consistent and isolated minorities (Christiano 2010: 
132-36). Such problems are exacerbated by the way the very size of the EU decreases 
both the representativeness of the European Parliament (EP) and the capacity and 
willingness of citizens to become informed about complex matters on which they can 
make little impact. After all, if constituencies were of equal size, then each of the 751 
MEPs in the EP would represent around 675,000 voters against an average of 10,000 
for every MP in a national parliament such as the UK. In fact, given the over 
representation of smaller countries, most constituencies are far larger. Meanwhile, 
trans-European interest groups and parties, which might offer cues on EU matters to 
electors, barely exist except as EU funded coalitions of national groupings within 
European institutions. Unsurprisingly, elections to the (EP) consist of second-order 
national elections (Hix and Marsh 2011), with electoral turn out steadily decreasing 
from the high of 61.99% in 1979 to the low of 42.61% in 2014 despite as steady an 
increase in the powers of the EP. Little wonder that decision-making at the EU level 
is perceived and criticised as monopolised by unaccountable elites. 
It can be countered that large, socially and culturally diverse democracies 
exist, such as India. However, as I noted, such cases of state building occurred 
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through war and were accompanied by extensive and invariably coercive processes of 
nation building – in India’s case two centuries of armed occupation and colonial rule. 
Today such processes would be deemed unacceptably illiberal and dominating. 
Indeed, those member states that employed them in the past to incorporate other 
political nations are now experiencing a resurgence of minority nationalist demands 
for greater political autonomy. Consequently, the legitimacy of EU level decision-
making depends to a high degree on there being multiple checks and balances for the 
different peoples of the member states, with most decisions within the EU requiring a 
consensus or a super-majority of states and citizens (Moravscik 2002). Yet such 
multiple veto points not only reduce effectiveness and efficiency but also can impair 
the equity of decisions by favouring the status quo and vested interests (Scharpf 
1998). They may be justified to preserve the equal entitlement to self-government of 
the various EU’s peoples but not as mechanisms for collective decision-making 
among a European people. In the former case, it will suffice to seek only Pareto 
improvements between the member states beyond securing to each a minimum level 
of socio-economic well-being sufficient to sustain a capacity for self-government. In 
the latter case, it would be important for individuals to seek a common framework of 
social and civil entitlements, and in this case counter-majoritarian checks and 
balances could lead to deficiencies and inequalities in provision if their origins lie in a 
lack of collective solidarity and identification (Bellamy 2010). 
Sensitive to these issues, some advocates of a federal EU suggest EU bodies 
should only decide those limited matters that require European solutions, so that 
current polities will retain most of their functions, albeit constrained by a 
supranational framework that regulates their interactions and promotes EU public 
goods (Habermas 2012: 38-41). This dual federal scenario, where federal and state 
units are responsible for different policy areas, differs from the unitary federal 
arrangement explored above, where states would possess powers that are devolved 
downwards from the centre and enforce federal policies. It does not conceive the 
participating polities as part of an overarching sovereign European polity. Rather, 
states would pool certain sovereign powers at the EU level in areas that lie beyond 
what each could handle individually.  
The crux of his proposal is that individuals possess a dual citizenship as 
citizens of their member state and of the Union (Habermas 2012: 29). Therefore, 
individuals would still need to form a EU people and their representation be relatively 
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diluted, with all the attendant difficulties noted above. However, Habermas suggests 
the reduced scope of policymaking he envisages could be achieved among a people 
only united by the thinner bond of ‘constitutional patriotism’ as the basis of a 
common ‘post-national’ European citizenship (Habermas 1998: 153, 159, 161). True, 
the abstract rights that figure in the European Convention of Human Rights and the 
EU Charter of Rights are shared by all the member states. Yet, most are embraced by 
democracies worldwide – after all, they are largely acknowledged as universal. That 
different peoples have these rights in common, though, does not mean they should 
automatically believe it legitimate to deliberate about them as a common people and 
be subject to a common sovereign authority for their interpretation and 
implementation. For all the aforementioned reasons, they may believe these tasks will 
be better achieved within a polity where the pre-conditions for impartial collective 
decision-making pertain and that can more appropriately realise the fundamental right 
to self-determination. 
Creating an EU polity and regime in the hope it might generate the conditions 
for a European people proves not only impractical without an unacceptable degree of 
domination but also unjustifiable and unnecessary. Unjustifiable, because it rests on a 
mistaken domestic analogy that assumes the citizens of member states can be likened 
to individuals who lie outside any constituted sovereign political order. However, 
citizens are already constituted as peoples within a sovereign polity, which are 
capable of offering them valuable ways of living that possess moral worth. Nor are 
these states to be regarded as relating to each other in the manner of individuals in the 
state of nature. As juridical orders, they can act as moral agents with regard to each 
other, as the development of international law indicates. Unnecessary, because the 
required task is not so much to offer individuals a basic political structure at the EU 
level capable of securing justice for them in a legitimate manner, as to ensure the 
existing structures of the different member states prove mutually supportive rather 
than oppressive, and can cooperate in non-dominating ways that enable their citizens 
to live on free and equal terms with each other. I return to both these points in section 
5 below. Before doing so, I wish to explore the arguments of those who reject 
sovereignty altogether. 
 
4. A Post Sovereign Europe?: Sovereignty Divided, Discrete, Dispersed and 
Dissolved 
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Post-sovereigntists also view state sovereignty as practically and normatively 
untenable in a globalising world but regard the displacement of sovereignty upwards 
to a federal EU or even a world state as equally indefensible, in part for parallel 
reasons to those given above. Instead, they propose the vertical dispersal of sovereign 
authority both above and below the state, with the result that individuals would be 
‘citizens of, and govern themselves through, a number of units of varying sizes, 
without any one political unit being dominant and thus occupying the traditional role 
of the state. And their political allegiance and loyalties should be widely dispersed 
over these units: neighbourhood, town, county, province, state, region, and world at 
large’ (Pogge, 1992: 58). Once again, the EU gets presented as an opportunity and a 
model. Its alleged multilevel governance structures are said both to allow citizens to 
participate in a variety of different sub-state, state, trans-state and supra-state political 
organisations and bodies, forming in each case a member of a different demos. These 
bodies are not necessarily hierarchically organised and depend often on voluntary 
compliance and consensual agreement between the various parties involved – be it in 
standard setting bodies such as the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), the 
comitology processes for devising EU regulations, or the ordinary legislative 
procedure of the EU that requires agreement between the EP and the Council of the 
European Union, thereby involving an agreement between the representatives of 
states and of citizens in bodies that themselves generally operate by broad consensus. 
As a result, through membership of the EU the member states are losing sovereignty 
without transferring to any other body within the EU itself (MacCormick 1999: 126). 
 The descriptive accuracy of this picture of the EU is deeply controversial 
(Morgan 2005: 120-24). Even if accurate, though, its normative coherence remains 
questionable. Republicans have taken up the post-sovereignty thesis and related it to 
the republican theory of the mixed constitution (MacCormick 1999: ch 9; Bellamy 
2003 – a position I now reject; Bohman 2004a: 348-49; 2004b; Besson, 2006; Ladvas 
and Chrissochoou 2011). They take inspiration from what Pettit (2012: 12) has called 
the Italian-Atlantic tradition of republican thought rather than the Continental 
tradition of Kant and Rousseau defended in Section 2 (Bohman 2005: 299). Just as the 
authors of The Federalist argued that a large and diverse republic rendered republican 
liberty more secure than in small republics (Hamilton et. al (‘Publius’) 1778, 10: 44-
6), not least when combined with the separation of powers, on the one side, and a 
territorial division of powers, on the other, so these cosmopolitan republicans consider 
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an even more radical horizontal as well as vertical dispersal of sovereign authority as 
favouring safeguards against domination rather than otherwise (Bohman 2005: 300). 
They concede that a single EU (or ultimately global) demos overlooks the divergent 
impacts of and interest in common policies of different groups of people across the 
EU, despite their being interconnected to various degrees (Bohman 2005: 339).  As a 
result, they argue one should conceive the EU as consisting of different demoi. 
However, they contend these demoi are not simply or primarily the peoples of the 
different member states, but increasingly the members of various subnational, and 
especially transnational associations of different kinds – not only regions and cities, 
but also CSOs and interest groups - that are functionally as well as territorially 
organised (Bohman 2005: 298).  
Like earlier republicans, they conceive the key risk in democratic politics as 
factionalism, with the problem no longer that of one part of the demos dominating the 
other but of different demoi dominating each other. Whereas the Rousseauvian 
solution had been to create a coherent public among whom collective decision-
making would be possible, they adapt the Madisonian reasoning to advocate the 
dispersal of sovereign power so that different demoi may each check and balance each 
other. However, the republican post-sovereigntists dispute the need for either 
supremacy or comprehensiveness. Instead, they argue that decisions must be shared 
among, and challengeable by, a range of different power centres and demoi. 
Moreover, decisions will necessarily be discrete, operating in specific areas and 
relating only to those people(s) with an equal interest in it. The focus in this account is 
as much on the democratic qualities of deliberation and contestation as on those of 
authorisation and accountability in order to secure responsiveness. The aim is to 
reduce the capacity for any one demos to dominate others through having to contend 
with multiple levels of power and authority (Bohman 2004b; 2005: 306). Yet 
sovereignty is not necessarily incompatible with this goal. Indeed, it may be necessary 
to its achievement. 
Though sovereignty implies a degree of unity among the people and their 
system of governance, section 2 indicated how it need not involve homogeneity or 
uniformity. The regime advocated by Publius was purposely that of a sovereign 
United States. And though they proposed a strong separation of powers and a 
bicameral legislature, each power has finality in its own domain and operates at the 
federal level, while a Supreme Court oversees the legal system, emerging as the body 
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capable of resolving disputes between the federal and state governments regarding 
their competences. In other words, a prime rationale behind dividing power so that 
different groups could check and balance each other was to nudge them away from 
pursuing purely sectional interests towards public deliberation and negotiation on the 
public interest. However, this was only achieved to the extent the Federal system was 
itself both comprehensive and supreme, forcing citizens, albeit mainly indirectly 
through their representatives, to converge as a collectivity on a common decision.1 
When a regime enjoys supremacy and comprehensiveness within a given polity it can 
function as a community of communities for its members. The polity wide regime 
both obliges and enables local and other discrete communities to take into account the 
effects of their decisions on non-members as well as other aspects of their members 
lives, providing a mechanism through which those involved can negotiate these 
relations in an equitable and public manner as a people possessing multiple 
memberships. These mechanisms also allow members to leave a given sub 
community and join others should they so choose.  
In the absence of any such comprehensive mechanisms, the dispersal of 
sovereignty among a multiplicity of discrete regimes would risk degenerating into a 
chaos of conflicting and partial polities, each self-reflexive and incomplete. No such 
incentives to give equal concern and respect to all citizens necessarily exist in an 
entirely dispersed and non-hierarchical system (Miller 2008: 141-47). They would 
only be likely to arise if interconnectedness was so symmetrical that individuals 
belonged to crosscutting groups. But if the divisions are segmented and asymmetrical, 
as cosmopolitan republicans concede is likely, then the rich and powerful may ignore 
or dominate the poor and powerless. In the absence of any basic political structure 
through which they might impartially establish mutually acceptable just relations, 
individuals would be divided in themselves and from each other (Thompson 1999). 
Of course, some critics of state sovereignty claim that the relations between states 
within an interconnected world operate in precisely this chaotic and partial fashion 
(Slaughter 2004: 186). The issue is to see if this situation can be avoided. 
 
 
5. A European Republic of Sovereign States? Sovereignty Delegated and 
Domesticated 
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It was argued above that for a popularly sovereign polity to incorporate under a 
supranational or transnational sovereign authority, even of a partial character, would 
be self-contradictory and a denial of the moral values the existing systems instantiate 
for their members. Yet, it would likewise be a contradiction in terms  - both morally 
and for self-interested reasons - for such popularly sovereign polities not to accept an 
obligation to respect and uphold the moral equality of other popularly sovereign states 
or the rights of those subjects and individuals denied citizenship of such bodies to 
enjoy that status. To do so would involve a failure to accept the moral status and 
obligations of sovereign authority as the means through which we can achieve justice 
in a manner consistent with non-domination. 
The third proposal, therefore, takes as its starting point that a supranational 
political structure must uphold: 1) that individuals can live as free and equal citizens 
of popularly sovereign polities; 2) that these popularly sovereign polities can be free 
and equal with regard to each other; and 3) that to achieve 1) and 2) involves not just 
non-interference but also, given they interact and are interdependent in many ways, 
ensuring that the regulations governing their interactions and mutual dependency treat 
the polities involved with equal concern and respect (Pettit 2010). The three elements 
are linked. Only if 1) is met will polities be likely to make agreements of the kind 
specified under 3) and so secure 2). They suggest a double form of delegation, 
whereby citizens exercising popular sovereignty at the domestic level delegate their 
respective representatives to make agreements with each other at the inter-polity 
level, including delegating and devolving authority upwards to appropriate regulatory 
bodies, so long as these remain under their joint and equal control.  
This double delegatory process means that such associations can be regarded 
as the product of a form of two-level game that can be termed ‘republican’ 
intergovernmentalism (Bellamy and Weale 2015; Bellamy 2013). In other words, 
politicians within in such an association must show each other equal concern and 
respect as the authorised and accountable representatives of their citizens, aware that 
any agreement among themselves must also be capable of being agreed to among 
their respective peoples. The net result of this double delegation is to preserve both 
popular and polity sovereignty of the contracting states to any international 
agreement, including one – like the EU – which involves the creation of supranational 
institutions. The upward delegation and devolution of power to the supranational level 
works in this respect in a parallel fashion to its downward counterparts at the 
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domestic level. In both cases, the sovereign authority of the people remains in the last 
analysis final, supreme and comprehensive with respective to themselves (Troper 
2010). Yet they obtain the facility – albeit mediated through their representatives – to 
cooperate with other peoples so as to support their mutual capacity for non-dominated 
rule. In this way, polities and their peoples preserve their internal sovereignty by 
agreeing on mutually agreeable institutions and laws for the regulation of their 
external sovereignty  - including the movement of citizens between their respective 
states (Cohen 2012: 317-18, 322). 
The resulting arrangement can be termed a supranational association of 
popularly sovereign polities. To a degree, such arrangements can be likened to a form 
of federation of states that does not involve sovereignty at the supranational level 
while modifying the exercise of sovereignty at the member state level (Kant 1797; 
Cohen 2012: ch 2). However, from the perspective outlined here certain proponents of 
this view go too far in considering that state sovereignty itself has been undermined 
by this arrangement (Forsyth 1981: 7, 207). Its very purpose and legitimacy depends 
on that not being the case. By contrast to Habermas’s two-level Federation, we need 
not regard the EU as an independent constituted order with a direct relation to 
citizens, in which EU institutions make laws that the Court of Justice of the EU then 
applies in a hierarchical, top down manner as the product of a self-standing, superior 
legal order. Habermas’s attempt to constitutionalise the EU misunderstands its 
rationale (Weiler 2001:  66, 68-70). Rather, as post-sovereigntists note, it is an order 
that states and their peoples have given and implement themselves not to supplant 
their sovereignty but to regulate its exercise with regard to each other.  
Such an association seeks to promote and be compatible with the possibility 
for all individuals to live in representative states that possess democratic systems 
where collective decisions are made in ways that show them equal respect and 
concern through being under their equal, public control. Four criteria guide this 
arrangement. First, it presupposes a commitment to the values of representative 
democracy, and their equal enjoyment by all the associated peoples. Second, if the 
legitimacy of popularly sovereign polities stems from them offering reasonably 
effective, public mechanisms for the identification and equal advancement of the 
interests of their citizens, then the legitimacy of supranational organisations stems 
from them doing likewise through being in their turn under the shared and equal 
control of the signatory polities acting as the representatives of their respective 
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peoples. Third, citizens of different peoples ought not to be discriminated against in 
their interactions. The mutual concern and respect that operates among sovereign 
polities ought to apply to the citizens of those polities in moving and trading between 
them. Finally, membership of such international systems should be voluntary. Not all 
polities will have an equal stake in collective arrangements on a given issue, and 
many will not have equal bargaining power. Voluntary arrangements allow sovereign 
polities to tailor their commitments to the interests of their populations and ideally to 
negotiate the terms of their adherence accordingly. 
Analysts of the EU from a demoi-cratic perspective have noted how many of 
its current structures can be assimilated to such an association (Bellamy 2013, 
Chevenal and Schimmelfennig  2013), which better corresponds to the aims of the 
main state actors involved in their creation than the aspirations of the so-called 
founding fathers (Milward 1993). Indeed, Article 4.2 of the Treaty on European 
Union states: 
 
The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as 
their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and 
constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall respect their 
essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, 
maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security.  
 
Intergovernmental arrangements remain crucial in deciding the scope of the EU, with 
Treaty changes requiring unanimity, while (again, contra Habermas 2102: 44) the 
European Council has become an increasingly key actor. Meanwhile, this 
intergovernmentalism has taken a republican turn through the increased powers 
accorded national parliaments that enable them to influence and control the 
negotiation positions of their Ministers and align them to domestic electoral 
preferences (Kröger and Bellamy 2016). True, the powers of the EP have grown. Yet, 
even it can be regarded as representing the EU demoi more than its demos. 
Constituencies are allocated on a national basis employing degressive proportionality, 
thereby allowing each member state to be represented by a range of parties, with 
European parties essentially parliamentary coalitions of national parties. Such a 
structure involves states delegating power upwards rather than downwards, but as 
with such delegations within a sovereign polity still keeping these competences under 
their joint and equal influence and control. The normative legitimacy of such a 
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supranational delegated authority involves its policies according equal concern and 
respect to each of the contracting states as popularly sovereign polities and so being 
capable of obtaining the long-term endorsement of their peoples.  
  
Conclusion  
The EU is currently subject to three apparently opposed political demands: calls for a 
return of sovereign powers to the member states; advocacy of the transfer of 
sovereign power upwards to the EU level; and support for a dispersal of sovereign 
power across multiple levels and different kinds of demoi, including minority national 
groups within member states desiring ever more devolved power. Each of these 
demands reflects a different evaluation of sovereignty that can be related in certain 
key respects to a republican argument for non-domination. I have suggested all are 
right in some respects and wrong in others, and proposed an alternative vision of the 
EU (and of the international order more generally) as an association of sovereign 
states that draws on all three. Such an association has as its constituent parts sovereign 
states that provide the context for popular internal sovereignty. Yet, they create 
external supranational institutions with certain federal seeming features with the 
capacity to enable their mutual regulation of their external sovereignty given global 
interconnectedness. However, this supranational order is in itself not sovereign over 
them. As a result, it is not itself a source of domination but rather a mechanism for the 
member states to avoid the possibility of any one of them dominating the others. In 
this way, it answers to the demand to provide a response to the pressures on external 
sovereignty in an interconnected world, on the one hand, and the potential injustice 
perpetrated by a sovereign authority on those who are excluded from membership, on 
the other, without giving up on internal state authority as the context for a popular 
sovereign regime capable of sustaining a non-dominating legal and political order for 
its citizens.2 
 
Declaration of conflicting interests  
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, 
authorship, and/or publication of this article.  
Funding  
   25 
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or 
publication of this article.  
 
References 
 
Arendt, H. (1958) The Origins of Totalitarianism, new edn. Orlando, FL: Harcourt 
Brace. 
 
 
Bellamy, R (2003) ‘Sovereignty, Post-Sovereignty and Pre-Sovereignty: 
Reconceptualising the State, Rights and Democracy in the EU’, in N Walker (ed), 
Sovereignty in Transition, Oxford: Hart :167-90  
 
Bellamy, R (2010) `Democracy without Democracy?: Can the EU’s Democratic 
‘Outputs’ be Separated  from the Democratic ‘Inputs’ Provided by Competitive 
Parties and Majority Rule?’, Journal of European Public Policy, 17 (2010), pp. 2-
19 
Bellamy, R (2012) `Rights as Democracy’, Critical Review of International Social 
and Political Philosophy (CRISPP), 15:4. pp. 449-471 
 
Bellamy, R (2013) `An Ever Closer Union of Peoples: Republican 
Intergovernmentalism, Demoi-cracy and Representation in the EU’, Journal of 
European Integration, 35: 5 (2013), pp. 499-516.  
 
Bellamy, R  and Weale, A. (2015) ‘Political Legitimacy and European Monetary 
Union: Contracts, Constitutionalism and the Normative Logic of Two-Level 
Games’, Journal of European Public Policy 22.2: 257-74 
 
Besson, S. (2006) ‘Deliberative Demoi-cracy in the European Union. Towards the 
Deterritorialization of Democracy’, in S. Besson and J. L. Martí (eds), Deliberative 
Democracy and its Discontents, Aldershot: Ashgate, ch. 9. 
 
Bohman, J. (2004a) ‘Republican Cosmopolitanism’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 
12.3: 336-52 
 
   26 
Bohman, J. (2004b) ‘Constitution Making and Institutional Innovation: The European 
Union and Transnational Governance’, European Journal of Political Theory, 3: 
315-37. 
 
Bohman, J. (2005) ‘From Demos to Demoi: Democracy Across Borders’, Ratio Juris, 
18.3: 293-314 
 
Buchanan, A. (2004) Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination, New York, Oxford 
University Press 
 
Burgess, M. (2000) Federalism and the EU, London: Routledge 
 
Caney, S. (2005) Justice Beyond Borders, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Chevenal, F. and Schimmelfennig, F. 2013. `The Case for Demoicracy in the 
European Union’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 51.2: 334-50 
 
Christiano, T. (2008) The Constitution of Equality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Christiano, T. (2010) `Democratic Legitimacy and International Institutions’, in  S. 
Besson and J. Tasioulis (eds) The Philosophy of International Law, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 119-37 
 
Cohen, J. (2012) Globalization and Sovereignty, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 
 
Dahl, R. A.  1989. Democracy and its Critics, New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press 
 
Dahl, R. A. (2001) How Democratic is the American Constitution? New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
 
Flikschuh, K. (2010) ‘Kant’s Sovereignty Dilemma: A Contemporary Analysis’, 
Journal of Political Philosophy, 18.4, 469-93 
   27 
 
Forsyth, M (1981) Unions of States, Leicester: Leicester University Press 
 
Habermas, J (2012) The Crisis of the European Union: A Response, Cambridge: 
Polity Press 
 
Habermas, J. (1998) The Inclusion of the Other, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Hale, T. and Koenig-Archibugi, M. (2016) Are Europeans ready for a more democratic 
European Union? New evidence on preference heterogeneity, polarisation and 
crosscuttingness, European Journal of Political Research, doi: 10.1111/1475-6765.12136 
 
Hamilton, A., Madison, J, and Jay, J  (1778) The Federalist, ed. T. Ball, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
 
Held, D. (1995) Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to 
Cosmopolitan Governance, Cambridge: Polity Press 
 
Hobbes, T (1651) The Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996. 
 
Hinsley, F H (1986) Sovereignty. 2nd edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Hix, S  and Marsh, M. (2011) `Second-order effects plus pan-European political 
swings: An Analysis of European Parliament elections across time’ Electoral 
Studies 30: 4–15 
 
Kant, I.  (1797) The Metaphysics of Morals in Political Writings ed. H. Reiss, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991 
 
Kalmo, H and Skinner, Q (2010) Sovereignty in Fragments. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
 
   28 
Kröger, S. and Bellamy, R (2016) ‘Beyond a Constraining Dissensus: The Role of 
National Parliaments in Domesticating and Normalising the Politicization of 
European Integration’, Comparative European Politics, 14.2: 131-53 
 
Laborde, C. and Ronzoni, M. (2015) “What is a Freee State? Republican 
Internationalism and Globalisation’, Political Studies, doi: 10.111/1467-
9248.12190 
 
Ladvas, K. and Chrissochoou, D. (2011) A Republic of Europeans: Civic Potential in 
a Liberal Milieu, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 
Lovett, F. (2010) A General Theory of Domination and Justice, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 
 
MacCormick, N (1999) Questioning Sovereignty, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Malcolm, N. (1991) Sense on Sovereignty, London: Centre for Policy Studies 
 
Marti, J. (2010) ‘A Global Republic to Prevent Global Domination’, Diacritica 24.2: 
31-72 
 
May, K. 1952. ‘A Set of Independent, Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple 
Majority Decision’. Econometrica, 10, 680-84. 
 
Miller, D. (2009) `Democracy’s Domain’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 37: 201-28 
 
Miller, D. (2008) `Republicanism, National Identity and Europe’, in C. Laborde and J. 
Maynor (eds), Republicanism and Political Theory, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 133-58 
 
Milward, A (1993) The European Rescue of the Nation State, London: Routledge. 
 
Moravscik, A. (2002) ‘In Defence of the Democratic Deficit: Reassessing Legitimacy 
in the EU’, Journal of Common Market Studies 40.4: 603-24. 
 
   29 
Morgan, G. (2005) The Idea of a European Superstate: Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Pettit, P.  (2012) On the People’s Terms, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Pettit, P. (2010) `A Republican Law of Peoples’, European Journal of Political 
Theory, 9.1: 70-94 
 
Pogge, T (1992) ‘Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty’, Ethics, 103: 48-75 
 
Putnam, Robert D. (1988) ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-
Level Games’, International Organization 42: 3, pp.427-60. 
 
Rawls, J.  (1999) The Law of Peoples, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 
 
Rousseau, J J (1762) The Social Contract ed. V. Gourevitch, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997 
 
Ripstein, A. (2009) Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy, 
Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press 
 
Rokkan, S. (1974) ‘Dimensions of State Formation and Nation Building’ in C. Tilly 
(ed), The Formation of National States in Western Europe, Princeton N.J.: 
Princeton University Press 
 
Sassen, S (1996) Losing Control? New York: Columbia University Press 
 
Scharpf, F.W. (1999), Governing in Europe. Effective and Democratic, New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Scharpf, F. W. (1998) ‘The Joint-Decision Trap’, Public Administration, 66: 239-78. 
 
Sheehan, J J (2006) ‘The Problem of Sovereignty in European History’, American 
Historical Review, 111.1: 1-15 
   30 
 
Skinner, Q (2010) ‘The Sovereign State: A Genealogy’, in Kalmo and Skinner 2010, 
pp. 26-46 
 
Slaughter, A-M (2004) ‘Disaggregated Sovereignty: Toward the Public 
Accountability of Global Governance Networks’, Government and Opposition 39: 
159-90 
 
Slaughter, A-M (2005) A New World Order, Princeton: Princeton University Press 
 
Stilz, A. (2009) Liberal Loyalty: Freedom, Obligation and the State, Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press 
 
Thompson, D. (1999) Democratic Theory and Global Society, Journal of Political 
Philosophy, 7(2): 111–25. 
 
Troper, M (2010)  ‘The Survival of Sovereignty’, in Kalmo and Skinner 2010, pp. 
132-50 
 
Weiler, J.H.H. (1998), ‘Bread and Circus: The State of the European Union’, 
Columbia Journal of European Law 4(2): 223–248 
 
Weiler, J J H (2001) ‘Federalism without Constitutionalism: Europe’s Sonderweg’ in 
K. Nicolaidis, R. Howse (eds), The Federal Vision, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 
 
 
                                         
1 Notoriously, the US system of government has failed to operate as Publius hoped, yet in most 
respects this results from an excess of checks and balances that weakens popular sovereignty. See Dahl 
2001. 
 
2 For comments on earlier versions, I am grateful to Miriam Ronzoni and this journal’s referees, Sandra 
Kröger, Albert Weale and audiences in Amsterdam, Exeter, Florence, Milan, Paris, Rijeka, Rome, and 
Zurich.  
